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Abstract. Competing technologies in emerging industries create uncertainties that dis-
courage supplier investments. Open technology can induce supplier investments, but may
also lead to intensified future competition. In this paper, we study competing manufactur-
ers’ open-technology strategies. We show that despite the risk of intensifying future com-
petition, open technologies by competing manufacturers may constitute an equilibrium
and can indeed induce supplier investments. In addition, we identify a technology-risk-
pooling benefit; namely, by opening technologies, competing manufacturers can induce
supplier investments in both technologies and later adopt the one preferred by the market.
However, manufacturers may also exhibit the prisoner’s dilemma and close their tech-
nologies despite the risk-pooling benefit. In this case, there is potential for collaborative
technology sharing through cross licensing. Finally, we show that manufacturers may
sometimes close their technologies to force supplier investments.
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1. Introduction
Many emerging industries exhibit tremendous poten-
tial, yet are hindered by the high costs of crucial com-
ponents. An example is the alternative-energy vehicle
industry. Between 2013 and 2014, U.S. electric vehi-
cle sales grew by 69% (Ayre 2015a), but electric vehi-
cles still have not grabbed a meaningful market share,
one of the reasons being high costs (Perkowski 2014).
For example, it was estimated that batteries alone in a
Tesla Model S sedan cost around $20,000 (Cole 2014)—
more than many economy cars. If battery suppliers
made investments to reduce battery costs, electric vehi-
cle sales may grow substantially, thereby benefiting
the suppliers as well.
However, emerging industries are also often faced
with competing technologies, which create uncertain-
ties that discourage suppliers frommaking cost-reduc-
ing investments. In the alternative-energy vehicle
industry, a competing technology to electric cars is
hydrogen fuel cell cars. In 2014, Toyota launched its
hydrogen fuel cell car Mirai, and Honda is set to follow
soon. Like electric cars, hydrogen fuel cell cars are also
expensive: the compact-sized, nonluxury Mirai carried
a sticker price of $58,250 in the United States (Gardner
2015). Comparing the two technologies, batteries and
hydrogen fuel cells each have their pros and cons,1 and
it is difficult to predict which technologywill dominate
the future alternative-energy vehicle industry.
Competing technologies put suppliers in difficult
positions. Take Panasonic as an example. Panasonic
is both a leading lithium-ion battery supplier (Deign
2015) and a pioneer in commercial hydrogen fuel
cell applications (Watanabe 2015). What if Panasonic
decided to make a major cost-reducing investment in
lithium-ion batteries now, only to find in 10 years
that the market prefers hydrogen fuel cell cars? This
kind of risk may cause a supplier to wait out the
technology uncertainty instead of making immedi-
ate cost-reducing investments, thereby slowing the
entire industry’s growth. The alternative-energy vehi-
cle industry is by no means the only example; another
case in point is the electrochemical energy storage
industry, where the leading manufacturers are divided
between using nickel–cadmium and lithium-ion bat-
teries as energy storage media (Lyons 2013). The
uncertain future market preference may similarly dis-
courage battery suppliers from making heavy invest-
ments in either battery technology.
When suppliers hesitate to make investments in
competing technologies, some firms adopt the strat-
egy of open technology. In June 2014, Tesla Motors
made a high-profile announcement that it would open
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its technology and “[would] not initiate patent law-
suits against anyone who, in good faith, wants to use
[their] technology” (Musk 2014). In the announcement,
Tesla’s chief executive officer Elon Musk explained
that “Tesla, other companies making electric cars, and
the world would all benefit from a common, rapidly
evolving technology platform,” rallying the industry’s
confidence and investments in the open technology.
Tesla’s move might have created an advantage for the
battery-car technology—briefly. Only several months
later, Toyota also announced that it would open 5,680
patents on its fuel cell technology for free adoption by
other automakers (Undercoffler 2015). The two firms
clearly chose to open their competing technologies in
a fight for the industry’s favor and support. Intuitively,
an open technology may better attract a supplier’s
investment because the technology may be adopted by
competing firms, which translates into more demand
for the supplier’s product. However, it is unclear how
exactly this reasoning will play out in a competitive
environment where a competitor also has the option
to open its technology, such as the case of Tesla and
Toyota. For example, the aforementioned advantage of
an open technology will disappear if the competing
firm also opens its technology.
It is worth noting that open technology has a long
history: since the Industrial Revolution, various indus-
tries including textiles, steel production, and personal
computing have all benefited from open technolo-
gies (Bessen 2014). Nonetheless, history also teaches
us another side of open technology. In the late
1970s, major personal computer manufacturers such
as Apple and Atari used proprietary (closed) architec-
tures, meaning that components produced for differ-
ent systems were not compatible. When IBM entered
the market with the Personal Computer (PC), it uti-
lized an open architecture, such that anyone could
make “IBM-compatible” computers (Miller 2011)—
effectively opening its architecture technology. This
strategy greatly stimulated component suppliers to
develop products for the PC (and PC-compatible com-
puters), and IBM quickly became the market leader.
However, once the PC proved successful, competitors
soon flooded the market with PC-compatible comput-
ers, and IBM’s market share dwindled to 5% before it
sold the PC business to Lenovo (Spooner and Kanellos
2004). This case illustrates that while open technology
can induce supplier investments, it may also lead to
intensified future competition. Similarly, it is conceiv-
able that Tesla and Toyota’s recent decisions to open
their technologies might intensify their future com-
petition. For example, if the market later manifests a
strong preference toward electric cars, Tesla’s open-
technology strategy would make it easier for Toyota to
switch to mass-producing electric cars.
The above discussion outlines the complex inter-
play of supplier investment and future competition
induced by open technologies. In this paper, we aim
to study whether competing firms will open their
technologies considering such interplay. More specif-
ically, we model two competing manufacturers; each
one owns a proprietary technology, and each one
may open his technology to the competitor. After
the manufacturers announce their technology strate-
gies, a supplier decides on whether to incur a fixed
investment to obtain the ability to supply components
for each technology. The market preference between
the two technologies is then realized, after which
each firm simultaneously chooses one technology to
bring to the mass market. Finally, the supplier prices
her component(s), and the two manufacturers either
enjoy monopolies in their own markets with differ-
ent technologies or compete head to head with the
same technology. We model the technology strategies
as decisions before the market preference is revealed
to reflect the case of Tesla and Toyota where open-
technology decisions are made under uncertain mar-
ket conditions to encourage supplier investments. On
the other hand, to capture open technology’s long-
term risk of intensifying future competition if the
technology proves successful, such as in the case of
the IBM PC, we model the manufacturers’ technology
choices for their mass-market products as decisions
after the market preference is revealed (see Section 3
for a more detailed discussion).
We use backward induction to fully characterize
the four-stage (technology strategy, supplier invest-
ment, product technology choice, procurement) game
and show that there is a unique subgame-perfect or
trembling-hand-perfect equilibrium. Our results reveal
a set of managerial insights (see Figure 1). First, we
confirm our intuition that despite the risk of intensify-
ing future competition, open technologies can indeed
induce the supplier’s cost-reducing investments when
the required investment costs are high (the top region
in Figure 1). This may partially explain the pheno-
menon of Tesla and Toyota opening their respective
alternative-energy vehicle patents. In fact, Tesla later
convinced Panasonic to invest $1 billion in a joint ven-
ture (Rogowsky 2014), which was projected to drive
down battery-pack-level costs by 70% (Ayre 2015b).
Second, we find that open technologies may yield a
technology-risk-pooling benefit (the lower right region
in Figure 1), namely, that by opening technologies,
competing manufacturers can induce supplier invest-
ments in both technologies and later adopt the one
preferred by the market. This benefit tends to mate-
rialize when the substitution between the technolo-
gies is strong. Third, the manufacturers may also face
the prisoner’s dilemma and close their technologies,
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Figure 1. Manufacturers’ Equilibrium Technology Strategies
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despite the risk-pooling benefit when both technolo-
gies are open (the lower left region in Figure 1). In
this case, there is potential for collaborative technology
sharing through cross licensing. Finally, somewhat sur-
prisingly, when both the investment cost and the sub-
stitution between the technologies are in intermediate
ranges, the manufacturers may close their technolo-
gies to force supplier investments in both technologies
(the lower middle region in Figure 1), which means
manufacturers may become less willing to open their
technologies as investment costs increase.
We then investigate several model extensions that
demonstrate the robustness of the base model’s in-
sights and also yield new insights. First, when the
original technology owner has a first-mover advan-
tage in the market, the base model’s equilibrium struc-
ture largely remains. Second, asymmetric investment
costs or market preferences can lead to different asym-
metric equilibria. With low investment costs, the dis-
advantaged technology (in either investment cost or
market preference) tends to be open to better compete
with the advantaged technology for supplier invest-
ment, whereas with high investment costs, the advan-
taged technology tends to be open to induce the
supplier’s investment, while the disadvantaged tech-
nology becomes irrelevant. Third, when an alternative
sourcing option exists, the focal supplier may be driven
to investmore aggressivelywhen the alternative source
is expensive, but will give in and not make any invest-
ment if the alternative source is sufficiently cheap.
Therefore, having an alternative sourcing option does
not always stimulate supplier investments. Also, when
the alternative sourcing option is affordable, asymmet-
ric equilibria can arise between two completely sym-
metric manufacturers, where one opens his technology
to attract the focal supplier’s investment and the other
closes his technology and depends on the alternative
sourcing option.
In what follows, we review the related literature in
Section 2, and introduce the base model in Section 3.
The analysis and main results of the base model are
presented in Section 4. We then discuss various exten-
sions in Section 5 before concluding the paper and indi-
cating potential future research directions in Section 6.
All proofs are relegated to the online appendix.
2. Literature Review
Our paper is related to the literature on firms’ tech-
nology strategies and their interactions with the firms’
operational decisions. To the best of our knowledge,
we are the first in the operations literature to consider
firms’ open-technology strategies, namely, one firm
allowing competitors to use its proprietary technol-
ogy. Various papers in this stream consider other types
of technology strategies. Goyal and Netessine (2007)
study multiproduct firms’ flexible versus dedicated
production technology choices in a competitive envi-
ronment with uncertain demand. Open technology
bears some resemblance to their flexible technology
in the sense that both enable some pooling benefit
but may also lead to intensified competition. How-
ever, the mechanisms behind them are completely
different. In Goyal and Netessine (2007), each manu-
facturer decides on whether to allow capacity sharing
across its own products, and thus capacity shar-
ing is a centralized decision, whereas in our open-
technology problem, two manufacturers unilaterally
decide on whether to open their respective technolo-
gies to competitors, and thus technology sharing is
a decentralized outcome. Additionally, while open
technology results in risk-pooling benefits similar to
flexible capacity, its first-order effect is incentivizing
the supplier’s cost-reducing investments. Such vertical
interactions across two supply chain tiers are absent in
their paper. Along the same line of capacity flexibil-
ity, Boyabatlı et al. (2015) study the trade-offs between
flexible and dedicated technologies for a monopoly
whose budget is constrained; Boyabatlı and Toktay
(2011) consider relaxing this constraint by obtaining
technology-specific loan contracts from a creditor; and
Boyabatlı (2015) further considers a third option in the
flexible technology spectrum, fixed proportions tech-
nology, and identify its cost-pooling benefits. These
papers similarly contrast with our paper in their cen-
tralized capacity sharing decisions versus our decen-
tralized technology sharing competition. They also do
not study horizontal interactions between competing
manufacturers. We refer the reader to Boyabatlı et al.
(2015) for a more comprehensive, recent review of this
stream of research.
Technology strategies other than gaining capacity
flexibility have also been investigated. Debo et al.
(2005) study the joint pricing and production technol-
ogy decision by a firm introducing a remanufacturable
product. The technology decision is modeled as a con-
tinuous remanufacturability level that influences the
recoverable value from a used product. Krishnan and
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Bhattacharya (2002) explore the choice between a cer-
tain, proven technology and a superior prospective
technology with uncertain viability. In a dynamic set-
ting, Wang et al. (2013) study the environmental trade-
off between a conventional technology and a more
costly new technology with a lower carbon footprint.
None of these papers considers horizontal interac-
tions (competition). A rare example of a model encom-
passing both vertical and horizontal interactions is by
Erat and Kavadias (2006), who consider a technology
provider that develops and sells two technologies over
two periods to competing manufacturers. The technol-
ogy introduced in the second period is an upgrade
of the one introduced in the first period. This is of
course a completely different problem from the one in
this paper.
One may find our research problem of compet-
ing firms choosing to open versus close technolo-
gies similar to standard wars, such as those between
VHS and Betamax, and between Blu-ray and high-
definition DVD. However, the two problems are fun-
damentally different. A standard is, by definition, open
for adoption by any firm, but for a licensing fee. There-
fore, standard wars occur between parties supporting
already-open technologies. By contrast, in our problem
the technologies are closed by default, and the manu-
facturers’ decisions of whether to open their respective
technologies are our very focus. Standard wars have
been widely studied in economics; we refer the reader
to Suarez (2004) for a recent review of the related
literature.
Finally, our paper is related to the literature on
the open-source movement in the software industry.
Lerner and Tirole (2004) rationalize the growing open-
source movement by using existing economic theories.
Economides and Katsamakas (2006) and Casadesus-
Masanell and Ghemawat (2006) study the competition
between a proprietary system (e.g., Windows) and an
open-source system (e.g., Linux) in the presence of
network externalities. Casadesus-Masanell and Llanes
(2011) explore the mixed source model where some
but not all modules are open source. While this litera-
ture deals with open versus closed technologies, most
work there exclusively consider the consumer-side net-
work effect. In other words, the emphasis is on how an
open technology can attract more users because they
anticipate more network benefits, compared to propri-
etary technologies (see Weber 2004). In our model, we
deliberately exclude consumer-side network benefits to
isolate open technologies’ supply-side effect of incen-
tivizing supplier investments, and by doing so prove
that open technologies may be driven by supply-side
network effects alone.
In summary, our work contributes to the study of
open versus closed technologies in general by focus-
ing on the supply side and bringing in operational
considerations such as supplier investments and pro-
curement interactions.We show that open technologies
can incentivize supplier investments and provide risk-
pooling benefits; on the other hand, closed technolo-
gies may also force the supplier to make technology
investments. These insights complement our existing
knowledge about open technologies’ consumer-side
impacts.
3. Base Model
We consider two manufacturers M1 and M2 (he) en-
dowed with proprietary, incompatible, and partially
substitutable technologies 1 and 2 (T1 and T2), respec-
tively; e.g., Tesla and Toyota respectively utilizing bat-
teries and hydrogen fuel cells to power their cars. Both
technologies require key components from one sup-
plier S (she); e.g., Panasonic. (In Section 5.4, we con-
sider the case where there is an exogenous alternative
sourcing option for the manufacturers.) The supplier
has the fundamental technical know-how to supply
key components for both technologies; e.g., produc-
ing batteries and fuel cells. However, the supplier’s
current production costs are prohibitively high, ren-
dering these technologies nonviable for the mass mar-
ket. Nonetheless, she can make a fixed investment K
to reduce the production cost for each component
to an acceptable level (which we normalize to zero)
and obtain the capability to economically supply the
component; e.g., research and development for inno-
vative manufacturing methods and/or constructing
high-volume production facilities for batteries or fuel
cells. We also allow S to spend 2K and obtain the
capability to economically supply components for both
technologies. It is worth noting that the required sup-
plier investment K does not depend on whether a tech-
nology is open or closed; for example, it would require
the same amount of investment for Panasonic to reduce
its battery cost, regardless ofwhether Tesla allows com-
petitors to use its battery-based electric vehicle power-
train technology. The fixed K is a simplification for
tractability; in practice, a supplier will be able to choose
the investment amount. However, investments and cost
reductions typically do not have a linear relationship;
an investment often needs to reach a critical threshold
before it can substantially reduce production costs. In
this sense, the fixed K qualitatively captures this critical
threshold.
We assume a unit-sized market, whose preference
between the two technologies is initially uncertain.
We model the market share that prefers technology 1
with a random variable A ∼ Uniform[0, 1]; thus, the
market share that prefers technology 2 is 1 − A. This
setup reflects the technology uncertainties faced by
manufacturers and suppliers in emerging industries;
see Section 1. The manufacturers choose their technol-
ogy strategies (open versus closed), and the supplier
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decides on which technology or technologies to invest
in, before the market preference is realized. As is in
the case of Tesla and Toyota, an open technology can
be adopted by a competitor free of charge, whereas
a closed technology cannot be adopted by competi-
tors. On the other hand, to capture the fact that a
manufacturer that opens his technology exposes him-
self to competitor entry if the technology proves suc-
cessful, e.g., in the case of the IBM PC, we model the
manufacturers’ choices of technologies for their mass-
market products, which take place after the market
preference is realized. A more detailed remark on this
point is offered later. If they introduce different tech-
nologies to the market, then each manufacturer will
monopolize the market share that prefers his technol-
ogy. On the other hand, if they introduce the same
technology to the market (which can only happen if
this is an open technology), a γ fraction of the absent
technology’s market share will spill over into this tech-
nology’s market share, in which the two manufactur-
ers engage in Cournot competition. The parameter γ
therefore measures the substitutability between the
two technologies. All agents are risk neutral and max-
imize their expected profits. The sequence of events is
summarized as follows and illustrated in Figure 2:
Stage 1 (Ex ante manufacturer technology strategy).
M1 and M2 simultaneously announce whether they
will open their proprietary technologies. Once a tech-
nology is open, the competitor can adopt it free of
charge; otherwise, the competitor cannot adopt it.
Stage 2 (Ex ante supplier investment). The supplier
decides on whether to obtain the supply capabilities
for the two technologies, each of which costs K. Once
she obtains the supply capability for a technology, she
can produce the components at (normalized) cost zero.
Stage 3 (Ex post manufacturer’s technology choice).
Once the market preference A ∼ Uniform[0, 1] is real-
ized, M1 and M2 choose technologies for their prod-
ucts. If they adopt different technologies, then the
market share that prefers each technology becomes its
market size. On the other hand, if they adopt the same
technology (only possible with an open technology),
Figure 2. Sequence of Events
Manufacturers announce
open or close technologies
Supplier obtains
supply capabilities
Manufacturers choose
technologies to adopt
Supplier sets wholesale prices;
manufacturers choose order quantities
3TAGE 1
3TAGE 2
3TAGE 3
3TAGE 4
-ARKET PREFERENCES ARE REALIZED
a γ fraction of the absent technology’s market share
will spill over into this technology’s own market share
to form its market size. For example, if both manu-
facturers adopt technology 2, then its market size is
(1−A)+ γA.
Stage 4 (Ex post procurement game). After the manu-
facturers have chosen their technologies, a procure-
ment game takes place. First, the supplier sets com-
ponent wholesale price wi of each technology i for
which she has obtained the supply capability. Theman-
ufacturers then simultaneously decide on their order
quantities for their chosen technologies. If they market
different technologies, then each manufacturer enjoys
a Cournot monopoly in his own technology’s market
share (i.e., market clearing price equals market size
minus output). If they market the same technology,
then they engage in Cournot duopoly competition (i.e.,
market clearing price equals market size minus total
output) in this technology’s market, where the market
size contains the spillover from the absent technology’s
market share.
3.1. Remarks on the Base Model
Our base model captures the most salient elements
of real-life manufacturers’ open-technology consider-
ations, including technology uncertainty, competitor
response, supplier investment, and intensified compe-
tition after a technology proves popular. Belowwe offer
some remarks on the base model.
• Simultaneous order quantity decisions. We assume
that after choosing their technologies, M1 and M2
simultaneously determine their order quantities even
when one of them adopts the competitor’s open tech-
nology. This assumption may not be in line with
the intuition that the original owner of a technology
should have a head start over a late adopter in the mar-
ket. However, this is not necessarily the case in many
industries with long product development lead times.
For example, Tesla’s truly mass-market product, the
Model 3 sedan, has been in planning for several years
but is not expected to enter full production until 2018
(Edelstein 2015), four years after it opened its tech-
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nology. Such long lead times mean that the original
technology owner is not guaranteed a head start. Nev-
ertheless, we still investigate sequential order quantity
decisions in Section 5.1 and show that the base model’s
equilibrium structure largely remains.
• Symmetry. For simplicity, we consider symmetric
technologies in the base model. We will explore asym-
metric technologies in Sections 5.2 and 5.3, where we
show that our main insights are robust and reveal new
insights pertaining to asymmetric technologies.
• Exclusive supplier. The assumption that both man-
ufacturers depend on one supplier for component sup-
ply is a clear simplification. In Section 5.4 we will
consider an extension where an exogenous alternative
source of supply exists and show that the manufactur-
ers’ behaviors do not change substantially.
• Ex post manufacturer technology choices. We assume
that the manufacturers choose which technologies to
bring to the market after the market preference is
known. One may argue that in some cases firms intro-
duce new technologies before the market preference
is clear, but in such cases the sales volume tends to
be limited. For instance, Toyota launched its hydrogen
fuel cell car Mirai before learning the market prefer-
ence, but the sales expectation was merely 200 units in
the first year (Woodyard 2015). We instead focus on the
manufacturers’ technology choices for mass-market
products, which usually take place after the market
preference is revealed. For example, Hewlett-Packard
used to produce business-oriented minicomputers, but
entered the PC-compatible personal computer market
after IBM’s PC success. Modeling the manufacturers’
ex post mass-market technology choices is essential in
capturing an open technology’s long-term risk of inten-
sifying future competition.
• Market model. For tractability, we utilize a simple
market model. Despite the simplicity, it captures the
features that are most essential to our research prob-
lem: (1) consumers have preferences between technol-
ogies; (2) consumers respond to pricing; (3) competi-
tion drives down the price; (4) supplier investments
indirectly benefit consumers by reducing costs; and
(5) the competing technologies are partial substitutes.
The insights from ourmodel are driven qualitatively by
these features, rather than the specific form of the mar-
ket model.
4. Model Analysis
The base model is a multistage game, and we aim to
find the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium. To solve
the model, we first find the subgame equilibria of
stages 2 to 4 (supplier investment, manufacturer tech-
nology choice, and procurement game) for all possible
outcomes of stage 1 (manufacturer technology strat-
egy). We then solve for the equilibrium of stage 1 based
on these subgame equilibria.
4.1. Stages 2 to 4: Supplier Investment,
Manufacturer Technology Choice, and
Procurement Game
There are three possible outcomes of stage 1: bothman-
ufacturers open their technologies, one manufacturer
opens his technology and the other does not, and both
manufacturers close their technologies. We will ana-
lyze each outcome below. In what follows, to spec-
ify profits pi, we use superscripts CC, OC, CO, and
OO to denote that M1 and M2 have opened (O) or
closed (C) their respective technologies, and subscripts
i , j to denote player i in stage j, where i can be s,
m1, or m2 for the supplier, M1, or M2, respectively,
and j can be 1, 2, 3, or 4. For example, piCOm1, 2 represents
M1’s optimal profit in stage 2, given that M1 closes the
technology andM2 opens the technology. Let wi and qi
denote the wholesale price and order quantity for Mi .
While some notation is reused in different scenarios,
the context should eliminate any ambiguity.
4.1.1. Scenario CC: Both Manufacturers Close Tech-
nologies. In this scenario, each manufacturer always
stays within his technology’s market share; thus, the
supplier can decide her investment for each technol-
ogy individually. For symmetry, she will invest in both
technologies or neither. We derive the manufactur-
ers’ profits on the basis of the supplier’s investment
decisions.
Case 1: Supplier invests in neither technology. In this
trivial case, every player receives zero profit: piCCs , 2 
piCCm1, 2  pi
CC
m2, 2  0. This is the situation that neither tech-
nology will be adopted by the mass consumer market.
Case 2: Supplier invests in both technologies. For sym-
metry, we only consider M1. Given wholesale price w1,
M1’s profit in stage 4 is piCCm1, 4(q1)  (A − q1 −w1)q1,
and the optimal order quantity q∗1 is (A − w1)/2. The
expressions for M2 are similar, with A replaced by
1 − A. Accordingly, the supplier’s profit is piCCs , 4 (A−w1)w1/2+(1−A−w2)w2/2, and the optimalwhole-
sale prices are w∗1  A/2 and w∗2  (1−A)/2. In stage 4,
the optimal profits for the supplier, M1, and M2 are,
respectively, piCCs , 4 A2/8+ (1−A)2/8, piCCm1, 4 A2/16, and
piCCm2, 4  (1 − A)2/16. Since M1’s and M2’s profits are
positive, in stage 3, M1 and M2 will both introduce
their technologies to the market if the supplier obtains
supply capabilities in stage 2. Finally, in stage 2, the
supplier’s expected profit from investing in both tech-
nologies is piCCs , 2  ƐA[piCCs , 4] − 2K  1/12− 2K. Therefore,
the supplier invests in both technologies if K < 1/24
(the supplier’s expected profit from investing in a
closed technology); otherwise, she invests in none,
which is formalized in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 (Scenario CC). When both manufacturers
close their technologies,
(i) if K ≥ 1/24, the supplier invests in neither technology,
and piCCs , 2  pi
CC
m1, 2  pi
CC
m2, 2  0;
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(ii) if K < 1/24, the supplier invests in both technologies,
and piCCs , 2  1/12− 2K, piCCm1, 2  piCCm2, 2  1/48.
4.1.2. Scenarios OC, CO: Only One Manufacturer
Opens His Technology. For symmetry, it suffices to
consider scenario OC, where only M1 opens the tech-
nology. We derive the firms’ profits on the basis of the
supplier’s investment decisions.
Case 1: Supplier invests in neither technology. In this
trivial case, every player receives zero profit: piOCs , 2 
piOCm1, 2  pi
OC
m2, 2  0.
Case 2: Supplier invests in only one technology. In this
case, the supplier chooses between investing in T1
and T2. When she invests in T1, M2 will adopt T1, lead-
ing to some market expansion but also competition in
the market, which benefits the supplier compared with
when she invests in the closed T2 and forces M1 out of
the market. This observation is generally true for the
base model and can be formalized into the following
lemma.
Lemma 1. When the supplier invests in only one technol-
ogy, she invests in an open technology.
When the supplier invests in T1, her market size
becomes Aˆ≡A+γ(1−A) γ+ (1−γ)A due to spillover.
In stage 4, given wholesale price w1, M1 and M2
engage in Cournot competition with symmetric profit
functions piOCi , 4  (Aˆ − q1 − q2 − w1)qi , i m1,m2. The
equilibrium order quantities are qOCi , 4  (Aˆ − w1)/3, i 
m1,m2, and the resulting supplier’s profit is piOCs , 4 
2(Aˆ − w1)w1/3. The supplier sets wholesale price w1
to maximize her profit, leading to equilibrium order
quantity Aˆ/6 for each manufacturer, and equilibrium
profits piOCs , 4  Aˆ2/6, piOCm1, 4  piOCm2, 4  Aˆ2/36. By taking
expectations with respect to A, the firms’ stage 2
expected profits are piOCs , 2  (1 + γ + γ2)/18 − K, piOCm1, 2 
piOCm2, 2  (1+ γ+ γ2)/108.
Case 3: Supplier invests in both technologies. In this case,
since T1 is open and the supplier builds both supply
capabilities, M2 can adopt either T1 or T2 in stage 3.
Therefore, we analyze two subcases: (I) M2 adopts T1;
(II)M2 adopts T2. This case captures the available tech-
nology flexibility for a manufacturer when his com-
petitor opens a technology.
In subcase (I), M1 and M2 engage in Cournot com-
petition in T1’s market, which has a total size of Aˆ due
to spillover. The analysis is similar to that of case 2,
and the firms’ stage 4 profits are piOCs , 4  Aˆ2/6, piOCm1, 4 
piOCm2, 4  Aˆ
2/36.
In subcase (II), M1 and M2 each monopolize the
market, of sizes A and 1 − A, respectively, for their
own technology. The analysis is similar to that of sce-
nario CC, and the firms’ stage 4 profits are piOCs , 4 A2/8+(1−A)2/8, piOCm1, 4 A2/16, piOCm2, 4  (1−A)2/16.
By comparing the two subcases, it is straightforward
to show that M2 will adopt T1 if and only if Aˆ2/36 ≥
(1 − A)2/16⇔ A ≥ (3 − 2γ)/(5 − 2γ), namely, when T1
is sufficiently popular. We can then calculate the firms’
stage 2 expected profits:
piOCs , 2 
∫ (3−2γ)/(5−2γ)
0
A2 + (1−A)2
8 dA
+
∫ 1
(3−2γ)/(5−2γ)
(A+ γ(1−A))2
6 dA− 2K

1
12 +
37+ 40γ− 20γ2
36(5− 2γ)3 − 2K,
piOCm1, 2 
∫ (3−2γ)/(5−2γ)
0
A2
16 dA
+
∫ 1
(3−2γ)/(5−2γ)
(A+ γ(1−A))2
36 dA

1
48 −
49− 46γ
216(5− 2γ)2 ,
piOCm2, 2 
∫ (3−2γ)/(5−2γ)
0
(1−A)2
16 dA
+
∫ 1
(3−2γ)/(5−2γ)
(A+ γ(1−A))2
36 dA

1
48 +
4− γ
27(5− 2γ)2 .
With all three cases analyzed, we can determine the
supplier’s optimal technology investment decision in
stage 2. Define two thresholds for the supplier’s invest-
ment cost:
βOC1 (γ) ≡
1+ γ+ γ2
18 ,
βOC2 (γ) ≡
(3− 2γ)(3− γ)(4γ3 − 8γ2 − 11γ+ 9)
18(5− 2γ)3 .
Note that βOC1 (γ) ≥ βOC2 (γ) for all γ ∈ [0, 1]. The
following proposition characterizes the equilibrium
in scenario OC (and by symmetry, CO, with the
manufacturer indices swapped).
Proposition 2 (Scenario OC). When only M1 opens tech-
nology,
(i) if K ≥ βOC1 (γ), the supplier invests in neither technol-
ogy, and piOCs , 2  pi
OC
m1, 2  pi
OC
m2, 2  0;
(ii) if βOC2 (γ) ≤ K < βOC1 (γ), the supplier invests in T1,
and piOCs , 2  (1 + γ + γ2)/18 − K, piOCm1, 2  piOCm2, 2  (1 +
γ+ γ2)/108;
(iii) if K < βOC2 (γ), the supplier invests in both technolo-
gies, and
piOCs , 2 
1
12 +
37+ 40γ− 20γ2
36(5− 2γ)3 − 2K,
piOCm1, 2 
1
48 −
49− 46γ
216(5− 2γ)2 ,
piOCm2, 2 
1
48 +
4− γ
27(5− 2γ)2 .
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One would expect that lower technology investment
costs always encourage the supplier to invest in more
technologies. It is interesting to note that the thresh-
old of the investment cost for investing in both tech-
nologies, βOC2 (γ), is not always positive, meaning that
the supplier may never invest in both technologies.
We define γOC ∈ [0, 1] as the solution to 4γ3 − 8γ2 −
11γ + 9 0. It is easy to verify that γOC ∈ [1/2, 1] and
is unique, and that βOC2 (γ) < 0⇔ γ > γOC. This leads to
the following corollary.
Corollary 1. When only one manufacturer opens his tech-
nology and γ > γOC, the supplier will invest only in the open
technology even if the investment cost is zero.
To understand this result, consider the following
trade-off for the supplier’s investment in only T1, in
addition to the obvious cost saving benefit. On the
one hand, M2 is forced to adopt T1 and compete
with M1, leading to a higher component purchase vol-
ume, which benefits the supplier. On the other hand,
M2 must forgo T2’s market share—save for the γ por-
tion that spills over to T1—and that hurts the sup-
plier. Clearly, a larger γ mitigates the latter effect and
makes investing in only T1 more favorable. When γ
is sufficiently large, the strategic motivation of induc-
ing competition alone is enough for the supplier to
give up T2—even when doing so does not save any
investment cost. This insight highlights strategic impli-
cations of a supplier’s technology investment decision
on future market dynamics, which would in turn influ-
ence the manufacturers’ technology strategies. Note
that the above discussion does not apply when both
technologies are closed, in which case the supplier
cannot induce competition by investing in only one
technology.
4.1.3. Scenario OO: Both Manufacturers Open Their
Technologies. We derive the firms’ profits on the basis
of the supplier’s investment decisions.
Case 1: Supplier invests in neither technology. In this
trivial case, every firm receives zero profits: piOOs , 2 
piOOm1, 2  pi
OO
m2, 2  0.
Case 2: Supplier invests in only one technology. By sym-
metry, we can assume that the supplier invests in T1.
The analysis is similar to that for scenario OC’s
case 2, and the firms’ stage 2 expected profits are piOOs , 2 (1+ γ+ γ2)/18−K, piOOm1, 2  piOOm2, 2  (1+ γ+ γ2)/108.
Table 1. Payoff Matrix for the Manufacturers’ Technology Choices in Scenario OO
M2’s choice
piOOm1, 3, piOOm2, 3 T1 T2
M1’s choice
T1
(A+ γ(1−A))2
36 ,
(A+ γ(1−A))2
36
A2
16 ,
(1−A)2
16
T2
(1−A)2
16 ,
A2
16
(1−A+ γA)2
36 ,
(1−A+ γA)2
36
Case 3: Supplier invests in both technologies. In this
case, both manufacturers can freely adopt any technol-
ogy. The manufacturers’ technology choice equilibria
in stage 3 are shown in Table 1, which presents the
manufacturers’ profits given their technology choices.
The next proposition characterizes the equilibrium
of stage 3’s manufacturer technology-choice game.
Technically, multiple equilibria may arise, but we select
one equilibrium following intuitive rules, which we
will note after the proposition.
Proposition 3 (Equilibria with Two Open Technologies).
When both manufacturers open their technologies and the
supplier invests in both technologies, consider the stage 3
manufacturer technology choice game:
(i) if γ ≤ 1/2, the Nash equilibrium is
(T1 ,T1) if A ≥ (3− 2γ)/(5− 2γ),
(T1 ,T2) if 2/(5− 2γ) < A < (3− 2γ)/(5− 2γ),
(T2 ,T2) if A ≤ 2/(5− 2γ);
(ii) if γ > 1/2, the Nash equilibrium is{ (T1 ,T1) if A ≥ 1/2,
(T2 ,T2) if A < 1/2.
Remark on Proposition 3 (EquilibriumRefinement).Tech-
nically, multiple Nash equilibria arise in both subcases.
In subcase (i), when (T1 ,T2) is an equilibrium, so is
(T2 ,T1), in which M1 and M2 swap technologies and
payoffs. Two manufacturers adopting each other’s
technology despite having their own is clearly not a
realistic scenario; thus, we rule out this equilibrium.
In subcase (ii), (T1 ,T1) and (T2 ,T2) may both be
equilibria; however, one always Pareto dominates the
other. After the dominated equilibrium is ruled out,
Proposition 3(ii) ensues.
The most important observation about Proposition 3
is that both manufacturers will adopt a technology
if it turns out to be highly favorable. (This includes
the cases when A is either sufficiently large or small.)
Although this observation itself is intuitive, it has a less
straightforward implication: when both technologies
are open and available, all parties benefit from technol-
ogy risk pooling because the manufacturers can wait
until the market preference becomes clear and adopt
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the more favorable technology. Note that this risk pool-
ing benefit is not fully available if one technology is
closed or if the supplier does not invest in both tech-
nologies. Therefore, it might drive manufacturers to
open their technology as well as induce the supplier
to invest in both technologies—even if eventually only
one technology will be adopted. On the other hand,
with A in an intermediate range (i.e., neither technol-
ogy dominates the other) and a low spillover factor,
the manufacturers introduce their technologies in their
own markets to avoid competition.
Using the equilibria in stage 3, we can then calculate
the firms’ expected profits in stage 2:
(i) if γ ≤ 1/2,
piOOs , 2 
∫ 2/(5−2γ)
0
(1−A+ γA)2
6 dA
+
∫ (3−2γ)/(5−2γ)
2/(5−2γ)
A2 + (1−A)2
8 dA
+
∫ 1
(3−2γ)/(5−2γ)
(A+ γ(1−A))2
6 dA− 2K

1
12 +
37+ 40γ− 20γ2
18(5− 2γ)3 − 2K,
piOOm1, 2  pi
OO
m2, 2 
∫ 2/(5−2γ)
0
(1−A+ γA)2
36 dA
+
∫ (3−2γ)/(5−2γ)
2/(5−2γ)
A2
16 dA
+
∫ 1
(3−2γ)/(5−2γ)
(A+ γ(1−A))2
36 dA

1
48 +
38γ− 17
216(5− 2γ)2 ;
(ii) if γ > 1/2,
piOOs , 2 
∫ 1/2
0
(1−A+ γA)2
6 dA
+
∫ 1
1/2
(A+ γ(1−A))2
6 dA− 2K

7+ 4γ+ γ2
72 − 2K,
piOOm1, 2  pi
OO
m2, 2 
∫ 1/2
0
(1−A+ γA)2
36 dA
+
∫ 1
1/2
(A+ γ(1−A))2
36 dA 
7+ 4γ+ γ2
432 .
With all three cases analyzed, we can determine the
supplier’s optimal decision on technology investment
in stage 2. Define three thresholds for this purpose on
the supplier’s investment cost:
βOO1 (γ) ≡
1+ γ+ γ2
18 ,
βOO2 (γ) ≡
74+ 80γ− 40γ2 − (5− 2γ)3(−1+ 2γ+ 2γ2)
36(5− 2γ)3 ,
βOO3 (γ) ≡
1− γ2
24 .
Note that βOO1 (γ) ≥ max{βOO2 (γ), βOO3 (γ)}, βOO2 (γ) > 0,
and βOO3 (γ) ≥ 0 for all γ ∈ [0, 1]. It is interesting to
observe that unlike Scenario OC, the supplier’s rev-
enue is always larger when investing in two technolo-
gies than in just one. For simplicity of notation, we
further define
βˆ(γ) ≡
{
βOO2 (γ) if γ ≤ 1/2,
βOO3 (γ) if γ > 1/2,
which is continuous at 1/2 and decreasing in γ. The
following proposition characterizes the optimal and
equilibrium outcomes in Scenario OO.
Proposition 4 (Scenario OO). When both manufacturers
open their technologies,
(i) if K ≥ βOO1 (γ), the supplier invests in neither technol-
ogy, and piOOs , 2  pi
OO
m1, 2  pi
OO
m2, 2  0;
(ii) if βˆ(γ) ≤ K < βOO1 (γ), the supplier invests in only one
technology, and piOOs , 2  (1+γ+γ2)/18−K, piOOm1, 2  piOOm2, 2 (1+ γ+ γ2)/108;
(iii) if K < βˆ(γ), the supplier invests in both technologies.
When γ ≤ 1/2,
piOOs , 2 
1
12 +
37+ 40γ− 20γ2
18(5− 2γ)3 − 2K,
piOOm1, 2  pi
OO
m2, 2 
1
48 +
38γ− 17
216(5− 2γ)2 ;
otherwise,
piOOs , 2 
7+ 4γ+ γ2
72 − 2K,
piOOm1, 2  pi
OO
m2, 2 
7+ 4γ+ γ2
432 .
With both technologies open, it is intuitive that the
lower the technology investment cost, the more tech-
nologies invested in by the supplier. However, for
a fixed technology investment cost, as the substitu-
tion between technologies increases, the supplier may
increase or decrease the number of supported tech-
nologies. On the one hand, when the investment cost
is high enough, as the spillover factor increases, the
supplier increases the number of technologies she sup-
ports from 0 to 1. That is because the strong spillover
allows the supplier to capture a sizable portion of the
market by supporting an open technology regardless
of the realized market preference, thus justifying the
high investment cost. On the other hand, when the
investment cost is low enough, as the spillover factor
increases, the supplier lowers the number of supported
technologies from 2 to 1. In this case, stronger spillover
means it is more beneficial for the supplier if both
manufacturers adopt the same technology, which they
may not do willingly. Therefore, with a strong enough
spillover, the supplier may invest in only one technol-
ogy to force both manufacturers to adopt the same
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Figure 3. Equilibrium Manufacturer Technology Strategies
and Optimal Supplier Technology Investment
0 17/38 1
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1/24
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1/18
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8. {CC,Both}
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 ()

2. {OO,Both}

Notes. γ˜ is the solution in [0, 1] to the equation βˆ(γ)  1/24, γˆ 
(√6 − 1)/2 ≈ 0.725, and γOC is the solution in [0, 1] to the equation
βOC2 (γ) 0.
technology. (In anticipation of this behavior, manu-
facturers may in turn force the supplier to invest in
both technologies by not opening their technologies;
see Region 4 in Figure 3.)
4.2. Stage 1: Manufacturer Technology Strategy
With the stage 2–4 subgames analyzed, we can finally
characterize the stage 1 manufacturer technology strat-
egy equilibrium and the ensuing stage 2 optimal
technology investment decisions by the supplier. (See
Figure 3 for an illustration of the outcomes; “OO” or
“CC” means that both manufacturers open or close
their technologies in equilibrium; “Neither,” “One,” or
“Both” means that the supplier invests in neither, one,
or both technologies as an optimal best response.)
In the stage 1 equilibrium analysis, we adopt the
trembling-hand refinement. A Nash equilibrium survives
the trembling-hand refinement if the equilibrium is
sustained even when each player has a small prob-
ability of playing the off-equilibrium strategy. Such
trembling captures possible errors in strategy execu-
tions and/or the risk of a player behaving nonra-
tionally. This is a widely accepted refinement that
ensures the equilibria to be robust in practicewhere not
all players are necessarily fully rational and perfectly
execute their strategies. In our model, a unique equilib-
rium survives this refinement. For convenience, we use
“the unique perfect equilibrium” to represent either
the unique subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium or the
unique trembling-hand-perfect equilibrium.Moreover,
for symmetry, when the supplier invests in one tech-
nology, she is indifferent between the two technologies;
thus, we do not specify exactly which technology she
invests in.
4.2.1. High Investment Cost
Theorem 1 (High Investment Cost: Open Technology Can
Incentivize Investment). Suppose K ≥ 1/24.
(i) If K ≥ βOC1 (γ), the supplier invests in neither technol-
ogy, regardless of the manufacturers’ technology strategies.
(ii) If 1/24 ≤ K < βOC1 (γ), the unique perfect equilibrium
of the stage 1 game is that both manufacturers open their tech-
nologies. The ensuing outcome in stage 2 is as follows:
(ii-1) if max{1/24, βˆ(γ)} ≤ K < βOC1 (γ) (or equiva-
lently, γ is large enough), the supplier invests in only one
technology;
(ii-2) if 1/24≤ K <max{1/24, βˆ(γ)} (or equivalently,
γ is small enough), the supplier invests in both technologies.
Theorem 1 characterizes the equilibrium behavior
when investing in a technology costs more than the
supplier’s expected profit from doing so, i.e., K ≥ 1/24.
In case (i), where the technology investment cost is very
high, the supplier never invests in any technology. This
is a trivial case where all strategies are technically Nash
equilibria, but these trivial equilibria have little practi-
cal value. In this case, technologies are not cost-efficient
enough for commercial adoption. In Case (ii), because
K ≥ 1/24, the supplier would not invest in any tech-
nology if it were closed (see Proposition 1(i)). There-
fore, both manufacturers open their technologies to
incentivize supplier investment. Then, in subcase (ii-1),
where spillover is relatively strong, the supplier invests
in only one technology, because even when this tech-
nology turns out to be less popular, the supplier is
still guaranteed a sizable market because of the strong
spillover from the absent market. Thus, the supplier
indirectly benefits from technology risk pooling and
saves the high investment cost for one technology. In
subcase (ii-2), where spillover is relatively weak, it is
too risky to bet on a single technology, and thus the
supplier invests in both technologies to take full advan-
tage of the technology risk pooling (see the discussion
following Proposition 3), which benefits the manufac-
turers as well.
When technology investment costs are too high for
the supplier to invest in competing closed technolo-
gies, open technology can induce supplier investment.
This insight from Theorem 1 confirms our intuition
in the introduction. The case of Tesla’s and Toyota’s
open technology “arms race” likely falls into this cate-
gory. The automotive industry is highly capital inten-
sive, and to boost industry confidence, both Tesla
and Toyota chose to open their technologies. This
might have been partially encouraged by Tesla’s open-
technology strategy.
4.2.2. Low Investment Cost
Theorem 2 (Low Investment Cost and Weak Spillover:
Closed Technology Fends Off Competition and May En-
courage Investment). Suppose K < 1/24 and γ < 17/38.
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The unique equilibrium of the stage 1 game is that both
manufacturers close their technologies. The ensuing stage 2
outcome is that the supplier invests in both technologies.
When investing in a technology costs less than the
supplier’s expected profit from doing so, and spillover
is relatively weak, the equilibrium outcome is always
that both manufacturers close their technologies and
the supplier invests in both technologies. However,
this equilibrium actually emerges for three differ-
ent reasons, which result in different off-equilibrium
outcomes.
First, when K < βOC2 (γ) (i.e., the investment cost is
very low), the supplier will invest in both technologies
regardless of whether they are open or closed. Hence,
the manufacturers do not need to incentivize supplier
investments. The relatively weak spillover means that
the potential market size for a popular technology
(including the spillover from the other technology) is
small. As a result, no manufacturer wants to unilat-
erally open his technology for fear of a small future
market. Therefore, bothmanufacturers close their tech-
nologies in a Nash equilibrium.
Second, when βOC2 (γ) ≤ K < βˆ(γ) (i.e., the investment
cost is in an intermediate range within [0, 1/24]), the
supplier will not invest in a technology if it is the only
closed technology. In other words, if one technology is
open and the other is closed, the supplier will invest
only in the open technology. Again, the relatively weak
spillover results in both manufacturers closing their
technologies. As a result, the supplier has to invest in
both technologies.
Third, when βˆ(γ) ≤ K < 1/24 (i.e., the investment
cost is relatively high within [0, 1/24]), the supplier
will invest in only one open technology if at least
one technology is open, and otherwise will invest in
both technologies if spillover is not overly strong, i.e.,
γ < γˆ (where γˆ > 17/38). Thus, both manufacturers
close their technologies to avoid being forced to com-
pete in a market that is potentially small due to weak
spillover; as a result, the supplier invests in both tech-
nologies. Since we have shown that open technologies
can encourage supplier investment, the fact that closed
technologies can also pressure the supplier to invest in
more technologies (from one to two) is perhaps sur-
prising and counterintuitive.
Theorem 3 (Low Investment Cost and Strong Spillover:
Open Technology Can Generate Risk-Pooling Benefit).
Consider K < 1/24 and γ ≥ 17/38.
(i) When K < βOC2 (γ), the unique equilibrium of the
stage 1 game is that both manufacturers close their technolo-
gies. In stage 2, the supplier invests in both technologies.
(ii) When βOC2 (γ) ≤ K < βˆ(γ), the unique perfect equi-
librium of the stage 1 game is that both manufacturers open
their technologies. In stage 2, the supplier invests in both
technologies.
(iii) When K ≥ βˆ(γ), let γˆ  (√6− 1)/2≈ 0.725:
(iii-1) If γ < γˆ, the unique equilibrium of the stage 1
game is that both manufacturers close their technologies. In
stage 2, the supplier invests in both technologies.
(iii-2) If γ ≥ γˆ, the unique perfect equilibrium of the
stage 1 game is that both manufacturers open their technolo-
gies. In stage 2, the supplier invests in one technology.
In case (i) of Theorem 3, the equilibrium outcome is
the same as in the first scenario discussed after The-
orem 2. In this case, the manufacturers do not need
to incentivize the supplier’s technology investment,
and the not-overly-strong spillover leads both manu-
facturers to close their technologies in a Nash equilib-
rium. However, unlike the case in Theorem 2 where
the spillover is even weaker, in this case, if both manu-
facturers were to open their technologies, the supplier
would invest in both technologies, and the manufac-
turers would be better off because of technology risk
pooling. This is a classic prisoner’s dilemma situation.2
To reiterate, with low technology investment costs
and an intermediate level of spillover, manufacturers
may be faced with the prisoner’s dilemma and choose
to close their technologies despite the full risk-pooling
benefit enabled by two open technologies. It means
that in such scenarios where firms will not unilateral
open their technologies, there may be potential for col-
laborative technology sharing, such as cross licensing
(i.e., an agreement between two parties to grant each
other rights to their respective patents). In practice,
cross licensing is fairly common; however, it usually
serves as a means for firms to trade patents as well
as to avoid or settle patent infringement disputes. In
such applications, the patents being cross-licensed are
often for unrelated technologies. Our result suggests
that two firms may use cross licensing to allow each
other access to competing technologies that serve fun-
damentally similar functions to enjoy technology risk
pooling and avoid the prisoner’s dilemma.
In case (ii) of Theorem 3, as in the second scenario
discussed after Theorem 2, the supplier will not invest
in a technology if it is the only closed technology. How-
ever, unlike that scenario with weak spillover, when
spillover is not overly weak, all parties benefit from
risk pooling when both manufacturers open their tech-
nologies. Since spillover is not very strong, the sup-
plier has to invest in both technologies to benefit from
full risk pooling. As a result, both manufacturers open
their technologies, and the supplier invests in both
technologies.
In case (iii) of Theorem 3, the supplier’s incentive
resembles the third scenario discussed after Theo-
rem 2; namely, the supplier will invest in only one
open technology if at least one technology is open.
In subcase (iii-1), if spillover is not overly strong, i.e.,
γ < γˆ, opening a technology may later lead to intense
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competition, and thus both manufacturers close their
technologies. By contrast, in subcase (iii-2), the rela-
tively strong spillover means that even a single open
technology is guaranteed a sizable market and makes
significant risk pooling possible. Therefore, both man-
ufacturers open their technologies to benefit from risk
pooling, and the supplier invests in only one technol-
ogy to balance risk pooling and investment cost.
It can be seen that with an intermediate level of
spillover, i.e., 17/38 ≤ γ < γˆ, somewhat surprisingly,
the equilibrium manufacturer technology strategy is
nonmonotonic in the technology investment cost. More
specifically, as the investment cost increases, the equi-
librium behavior changes from {CC, Both} to {OO,
Both}, and then back to {CC, Both}. The explanation
is as follows. First, when the investment cost is low
enough, the supplier will always invest in both tech-
nologieswhether themanufacturers open or close their
technologies. Although {OO, Both} generates higher
profits than {CC, Both}, manufacturers have an incen-
tive to unilaterally close their technologies to deter
competition. That is the prisoner’s dilemma. Second,
as the investment cost increases, the supplier will not
invest in a technology if it is the only closed technology.
As a result, both manufacturers open their technolo-
gies when spillover is not overly weak, and the supplier
invests in both technologies. Third, as the investment
cost rises further, the supplier will invest in only one
open technology if at least one technology is open; oth-
erwise, she will invest in both technologies if spillover
is not overly strong. Asmentioned, bothmanufacturers
prefer closed technologies. The second scenario occurs
when spillover is not overly weak, and the third sce-
nario occurs when spillover is not overly strong. As
a result, this nonmonotonic behavior is observed only
with an intermediate level of spillover. The nonmono-
tonic equilibrium technology strategies also lead to all
Figure 4. Firms’ Expected Profits
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players’ profits being nonmonotonic in the technology
investment cost (see Figure 4(a)).
Another interesting observation is that manufactur-
ers’ expected profits are nonmonotonic in the spillover
factor (see Figure 4(b)). On the one hand, when
γ ∈ [0, 0.84], the manufacturers’ expected profits are
increasing in γ. The reason is that for low technology
investment costs, when spillover becomes stronger, the
manufacturers tend to shift from closing to opening
their technologies to benefit from risk pooling. On the
other hand, when γ continues to increase, the supplier
invests in fewer technologies—because one open tech-
nology already provides significant risk pooling for the
supplier—and that causes the manufacturers’ profits
to drop. However, it can be observed that the supplier’s
profit is always increasing in γ.
Theorem 3 demonstrates that the spillover effect
greatly influences competing firms’ technology strate-
gies, particularly with low technology investment
costs. In general, stronger spillover tends to encour-
age open technologies for two reasons: first, stronger
spillover better mitigates the detrimental effect of com-
petition resulting from opening technologies; second,
stronger spillover improves technology risk-pooling
benefits.
4.2.3. Summary. Our analyses confirm the intui-
tion that open technologies can encourage supplier
investments. In addition, we present below a list of
somewhat unexpected managerial insights. The num-
bered equilibrium cases in the summary are defined in
Figure 3.
• When the investment cost and the demand spill-
over between technologies are in an intermediate
range, manufacturers close their technology to force
the supplier to invest in both technologies (equilibrium
case 4).
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• Besides encouraging supplier investments, open
technologies yield another benefit, namely, technol-
ogy risk pooling. This benefit is realized with either
high investment costs (as in equilibrium cases 2 and 3)
or strong spillover (as in equilibrium cases 5 and 7),
resulting in both manufacturers opening their tech-
nologies.
• With high technology investment costs or strong
spillover, as the investment cost rises, the manufactur-
ers tend to open their technologies to induce supplier
investments. However, as they do so, the supplier may
invest in fewer technologies due to the higher invest-
ment cost (see the change from equilibrium case 6 to 2
to 3 and from equilibrium case 8 to 7 to 5 when γ ≥ γˆ).
• With low technology investment costs and inter-
mediate spillover, manufacturers may be faced with
the prisoner’s dilemma and close their technologies
despite the benefits of technology risk pooling if both
technologies are open (see equilibrium case 8, 17/38 <
γ < γˆ). In this case, there is potential for collaborative
technology sharing, such as cross licensing.
• As the investment cost increases, manufacturers
may become less willing to open their technologies
(from equilibrium case 7 to case 4), and their equilib-
rium profits may increase (from equilibrium case 8 to
case 7; see the first two segments of Figure 4(a)).
5. Extensions
Owing to the complexity of the problem, we utilize
a simplified base model to flush out the fundamental
insights. It is necessary to check whether these insights
are robust when certain assumptions are relaxed or
modified. In this section, we investigate three main
extensions of the basic model: (1) sequential order
quantity decisions; (2) asymmetric technologies; (3) al-
ternative source of supply. While these extensions are
mostly tractable, it is difficult to present full results
because of their complexity. Therefore, we will present
the most representative results.
5.1. Sequential Order Quantity Decisions
In Section 3, we discussed why M1 and M2 simultane-
ously determining order quantities after choosing their
technologies is a more appropriate assumption for our
motivating example (see Remarks on the Base Model).
Nevertheless, sequential order quantity decisions may
fit certain business cases better; hence, we investigate
such a model. The comparison between sequential and
simultaneous quantity competitions is well studied,
and a key insight is that in sequential competition, the
first mover has an advantage over the second mover
(see Fellner 1949).
Specifically, we modify our base model so that when
M1 and M2 adopt the same technology, the original
technology owner determines his order quantity before
the other manufacturer in stage 4. Such a model cap-
tures business cases in which product development
cycles are short and original technology owners have
significant first-mover advantages. The detailed anal-
ysis can be found in Supplement A in the online
appendix; we illustrate only the stages 1 and 2 equilib-
rium outcomes in Figure 5.
The foremost observation is that the equilibrium
structure is largely consistent with the base model (see
Figure 3). This shows that most of our main insights
are robust under sequential order quantity decisions.
There are a few other notable observations, which we
discuss below. They are mostly driven by the fact that
when both manufacturers adopt the same technology,
sequential order quantity decisions increase the profits
of the supplier and the technology owner, but reduce
the other manufacturer’s profit, due to an increased
order quantity from the technology owner.
First, the region with the equilibrium {OO, One}
expands against the {XX, Neither} region. Under
sequential order quantity decisions, the supplier earns
more from an open technology; hence, there is a
stronger incentive for the supplier to invest in an open
technology.
Second, one may expect that there is more incen-
tive for a manufacturer to open his technology, because
when the competitor adopts his technology, the first-
mover advantage improves his profit. However, sur-
prisingly, the first-mover advantagemay actually cause
a manufacturer to close his technology when the
investment cost and spillover are in an intermediate
range. In such cases, the equilibrium is {CC, Both}
under sequential order quantity decisions, in contrast
with {OO, Both} under simultaneous order quantity
decisions (equilibrium case 7 in Figure 3). The rea-
son is that under sequential order quantity decisions,
Figure 5. Equilibrium Outcomes Under Sequential Order
Quantity Decisions
{XX, Neither}
{OO, One}
{CC, Both}
{OO, Both}
0.1625 0.6810
1/24
0.0471
1/16

K
{OO, One}
{OO, Both}
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when both manufacturers adopt the same technology,
the supplier’s profit is also improved. As a result, in
those cases, the supplier only invests in one technol-
ogy when both technologies are open. In anticipation,
both manufacturers close their technologies and force
the supplier to invest in both technologies.
5.2. Asymmetric Investment Costs
In this section we investigate technologies that are
asymmetric in investment cost. We denote the invest-
ment costs of technologies 1 and 2, respectively, by K1
and K2, and assume without loss of generality that
K1 ≤ K2. The detailed analysis can be found in Sup-
plement B in the online appendix; we illustrate only
the stage 1 and 2 equilibrium outcomes with vary-
ing K1 and K2 for γ  1/2 in Figure 6, where “X” indi-
cates that either an open or a closed technology of the
corresponding manufacturer can constitute an equilib-
rium, and Ti denotes the technology that the supplier
invests in. In addition, Figure S1 in Supplement B in
the online appendix, illustrates equilibrium outcomes
with other γ values, which have similar structures as
Figure 6.
We list some notable observations about Figure 6.
First, on the line K1  K2, the equilibria replicate those
in Figure 3 for γ  1/2. In the immediate neighborhood
of K1 K2, the equilibria remain the same except near a
single point (K1  1/24), where an asymmetric equilib-
rium arises. Therefore, the equilibria characterized for
the symmetric basemodel aremostly robust under not-
too-significant technology investment cost asymmetry.
Second, with asymmetric investment costs, asym-
metric equilibriamay arise, and inmost casesmanufac-
turer 2 opens his technology. (In those scenarios with
Figure 6. Equilibrium Outcomes Under Asymmetric Fixed
Costs K1 ≤ K2
{CC,Both}
{OO,Both}
{CC,Both}
{XX,Neither}
{CO,T2}
{OX,T1}
{CX,T1}
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1/1
8
0.0
642 7/7
2
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0
1/32
1/24
0.0642
7/72
K2
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an asymmetric equilibrium, if there is only one equi-
librium, it must be manufacturer 2 who opens his tech-
nology, and if there are multiple equilibria, there must
exist an equilibrium in which manufacturer 2 opens
his technology.) Recall that K1 ≤ K2; in other words,
T2 is the disadvantaged technology that requires a
higher investment cost. The fact that the disadvan-
taged technology is more often open is intuitive: since
the supplier is otherwise likely to invest in the advan-
taged technology, the manufacturer’s only hope is to
influence the supplier by opening his technology. This
strategy is evident in the equilibrium {CO, T2}, where
the supplier invests in the more expensive but open
technology 2. However, when the investment costs are
highly asymmetric with T2 being much more expen-
sive, this strategy no longer works, as is evident in the
equilibrium {CX, T1}, where the supplier always invests
in the less costly T1 regardless of whether manufac-
turer 2 opens or closes his technology.
Third, interestingly enough, in one equilibrium sce-
nario, {OX, T1}, it is the advantaged manufacturer M1
who opens his technology. Note that this occurs with
relatively high investment costs for both technologies.
In this case, even the advantaged manufacturer needs
to incentivize supplier investments, and the disad-
vantaged manufacturer’s technology strategy becomes
irrelevant.
5.3. Asymmetric Market Preferences
In this section we investigate technologies that are
asymmetric inmarket preference.We adopt a Bernoulli
market preference distribution as opposed to the uni-
form distribution in the base model, which helps us
manage the model complexity but also serves as a
robustness check on the market preference distribution
(we confirm that the base model’s equilibrium struc-
ture remains qualitatively unchanged under the new
distribution in the case of symmetric market prefer-
ences). To be specific, we assume that the market share
that prefers technology 1, A, follows a Bernoulli distri-
bution that takes value 1 with probability α and 0 with
probability 1−α, and that the market share that prefers
technology 2 is 1−A. In other words, the entire market
either prefers T1 or prefers T2. Without loss of gener-
ality, we assume α ≥ 1/2. This means that T1’s market
share is stochastically larger than T2’s; thus, M1 is the
advantaged manufacturer. The detailed analysis can
be found in Supplement C in the online appendix; we
illustrate only the stage 1 and 2 equilibrium outcomes
with varying α and K for γ  1/2 in Figure 7. The nota-
tion is the same as in Figure 6. In addition, Figure S2 in
Supplement C in the online appendix illustrates equi-
librium outcomes with other γ values, which have sim-
ilar structures as Figure 7.
We list some notable observations about Figure 7.
We omit detailed explanations for the observations that
mirror those about Figure 6.
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Figure 7. Equilibrium Outcomes Under Asymmetric Market
Sizes
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First, asymmetric equilibria may arise, and in most
cases the disadvantaged manufacturer 2 opens his
technology.
Second, on the one hand, the advantaged man-
ufacturer 1 opens his technology when the invest-
ment cost is high (equilibrium {OX, T1}). On the other
hand, as the investment cost decreases, manufacturer 1
tends to close his technology. Moreover, as the dispar-
ity between the manufacturers becomes larger, i.e., α
increases, manufacturer 1 is more likely to close his
technology, whereas the supplier tends to invest only
in the advantaged technology 1, regardless of manu-
facturer 2’s technology strategy (equilibrium {CX, T1}).
Third, the disadvantaged manufacturer may force
his competitor to open his technology by opening his
own technology. Consider the region with equilibrium
{OO, T1}, where the investment cost is moderate and
the disparity between manufacturers is small. In such
cases, the supplier always invests in only one technol-
ogy. If manufacturer 2 closed his technology, so would
manufacturer 1, to deter competition, resulting inman-
ufacturer 2 exiting the market. However, if manufac-
turer 2 opens T2, manufacturer 1 is forced to open T1
as well; otherwise, the supplier will only invest in T2,
which reduces manufacturer 1’s profit.
To summarize, the extensions to asymmetric tech-
nologies, either in investment cost or in market prefer-
ence, reveal highly consistent insights. First, the base
model’s equilibrium behaviors are robust under not-
too-significant technology asymmetry. Second, asym-
metric technologies may lead to asymmetric equilibria,
where in most cases the disadvantaged manufacturer
opens his technology.
5.4. Alternative Source of Supply
In this section, we assume that there is an exogenous
alternative source of supply for both technologies with
a fixed wholesale price s > 0 and unlimited capacity,
for example, an existing market for the critical com-
ponents. Recall that the focal supplier considered in
the base model can make an investment to gain the
capability to economically supply for each technology,
thereby achieving a marginal cost advantage over the
outside supplier. What is different now is that even
when the focal supplier does not invest in a particu-
lar technology, a manufacturer still has the option of
obtaining the critical components for his technology
from the alternative source at a cost premium. This
extension captures the situations where without signif-
icant investments to bring down component costs, the
technologies can still serve some premium customers.
The sequence of events is the same as for the base
model, with the modification that in stage 4, the manu-
facturers now have access to an alternative source. The
detailed analysis can be found in Supplement D in the
online appendix; we illustrate only the stages 1 and 2
equilibria in Figure 8 for s ∈ [1/2, 2/3].
We make a few observations about Figure 8. First,
when the alternative source is expensive, for all levels
of investment costs, the equilibrium structure is con-
sistent with the base model. For example, when s is
close to 2/3, we recover the equilibrium structure of
the base model for γ  1/2 (see Figure 3). Even when
the alternative source is not very expensive, as long
as the investment cost K is sufficiently low, the base
model’s equilibrium behaviors are recovered. There-
fore, the basemodel’s equilibrium behaviors are robust
for relatively expensive alternative sources of supply.
Second, as the alternative source becomes more
affordable, the high-investment-cost region where
the supplier invests in neither technology expands.
This is because the affordable alternative source
makes it more difficult for the focal supplier to serve
Figure 8. Optimal Decisions Under Alternative Sourcing
{CC,Neither}{CO,Neither} or {OC,Neither}
{CO,T2} or {OC,T1}
{CO,T2} or {OC,T1}
{OO,One}
{CC,Both}
{OO,Both}
{OO,Both}
{CC,Both}
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1 (s)OO
2 (s)OO
2 (s)OC
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0
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1/24
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a
Note. a1 ≈ 0.661, a2 ≈ 0.633, and aˆ ≈ 0.596.
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the manufacturers profitably. On the other hand,
the low-investment-cost region where the supplier
invests in both technologies expands as well. This is
because, faced with an affordable alternative source,
the supplier needs to compete more aggressively
for the manufacturers’ business. Accordingly, the
intermediate-investment-cost region where the sup-
plier invests in only one technology shrinks.
Third, with an affordable alternative source, asym-
metric equilibria arise between two symmetric man-
ufacturers. More specifically, in the intermediate-
investment-cost region, asymmetric equilibria arise
where one technology is open and the other is closed,
and the supplier invests in the open technology. In
these equilibria, the two manufacturers are faced with
drastically different market environments and display
different sourcing behaviors. For the manufacturer
with the open technology, when the technology is pop-
ular he has to compete with the other manufacturer,
but both can enjoy cheaper components provided by
the focal supplier. For themanufacturerwith the closed
technology, when the technology is popular he can
enjoy his own market share as a monopoly, but he
has to depend on the alternative source of supply at a
premium.
To summarize, the base model’s equilibrium behav-
iors are robust with an expensive alternative source
of supply. As the alternative source becomes more
affordable, depending on whether the investment cost
is high or low, the focal supplier may be more likely
to give in to competition and invest in neither technol-
ogy or compete more aggressively and invest in both
technologies. Finally, the alternative supply source
may induce asymmetric technology strategy equilibria
between two symmetric manufacturers. It is worth not-
ing though that while we have investigated the impact
of an exogenous alternative source of supply, it remains
to understand the impact of a strategic alternative sup-
plier or a supply-side market.
6. Conclusion and Future Research
Directions
Competing technologies are a common sight in emerg-
ing industries. They create technology uncertainties
that discourage suppliers from making cost-reducing
investments, slowing these industries’ growth to their
full potential. Motivated by the recent case of Tesla
and Toyota opening their competing alternative-energy
vehicle technologies, we study a model where two
competing manufacturers that own proprietary tech-
nologies choose whether to open their technologies
to each other. Based on the manufacturers’ choices,
a supplier then decides on whether she will invest
in either technology, followed by the manufacturers’
product technology choice and procurement endeav-
ors. Our model captures the most salient elements
of real-life manufacturers’ open-technology consider-
ations, including technology uncertainty, competitor
response, supplier investment, and intensified compe-
tition after a technology proves popular.
We analyze the game and fully characterize its equi-
libria. The results confirm that firms’ open-technology
strategies may induce supplier investments but may
also intensify future competition. Furthermore, the
results reveal insights beyond our initial intuition. We
show that in some cases, firms can close technolo-
gies to induce supplier investments. We also show that
besides incentivizing supplier investments, open tech-
nologies have another benefit, namely, technology risk
pooling. Finally, a prisoner’s dilemma situation exists
in which firms may choose to close their technologies
despite the full risk-pooling benefits when both tech-
nologies are open. In this case, there is great poten-
tial for collaborative technology sharing through cross
licensing. For a summary of the main insights, see Fig-
ure 1 in Section 1.
We then investigate several extensions and confirm
the general robustness of our main insights. Addition-
ally, we find that when two technologies are asym-
metric, the disadvantaged firm is more likely to open
its technology to influence the supplier’s investment
preference, and with an exogenous alternative source
of supply, the supplier may be driven to invest more
aggressively if the competition is weak, or may give in
to competition and notmake any investment if the com-
petition is strong. These insights further enrich those
obtained from the base model.
To our best knowledge, we are the first to investi-
gate the supply-side implications of open technologies.
Our analysis shows that firms’ technology strategies
give rise to rich vertical and horizontal interactions
throughout and across supply chains, and it suggests
that firms need to thoroughly understand open tech-
nologies’ far-reaching impacts before deciding on their
technology strategies. The insights revealed in this
paper may help inform firms in such decisions. More-
over, our analysis may extend to other players in tech-
nology ecosystems. For example, when a consumer
buys a car, he or she is actually buying a means of
transportation, of which the charging/fueling network
is also a “component.” Therefore, an energy company
considering building electricity charging or hydrogen
fueling networks is akin to a supplier considering mak-
ing investments into building components for electric
or hydrogen fuel cell cars, and our analysis may also
shed light on the impact of open technologies on charg-
ing/fueling network constructions.
There are a number of promising ways to further the
research on open technologies. First, we model open
technologies as being completely free for adoption,
after the cases of Tesla and Toyota. For continuity, we
do not expect small adoption costs to substantially alter
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our model’s behaviors, whereas the impacts of sig-
nificant adoption costs require future study. Another
common way to share technology is through licens-
ing, which makes a technology available but costly for
adoption and transfers the cost back to the technology
owner. Licensing bridges the extreme cases of com-
pletely closed and open technologies, and introduces
a new lever that modulates both competition and rev-
enue. Second, we consider each firm adopting only one
technology, after the cases of Tesla and Toyota, but a
firm can potentially adopt multiple technologies. This
would likely make the open-technology strategy even
more effective in inducing supplier investments, but
more subtle insights can only be revealed by a rigor-
ous study. Third, we model a single supplier investing
in technologies, after the Tesla and Toyota case, but in
other industries there may also be several oligopoly
suppliers or many small suppliers, noncooperatively
or cooperatively, making such investments. While we
have investigated the impact of an exogenous alter-
native source of supply, it remains to understand the
cases of multiple competing or cooperative strategic
suppliers or a supply-side market. Fourth, we model
strategic interactions between two manufacturers with
proprietary technologies. In practice, there sometimes
exist companies without proprietary technologies that
will adopt open technologies. Such “free riders” would
lead to potentially larger demands for the supply,
which further incentivizes supplier investments in
open technologies, but at the same time would also
intensify future competition, which discourages man-
ufacturers from opening proprietary technologies. It
requires further rigorous analysis to determine which
of these two effects dominates. Last, we intentionally
assume away consumer-side network effects to isolate
the supply-side effect, but it will be interesting to inves-
tigate the additional impact of consumer-side bene-
fits. It is well understood that consumer-side network
effects make consumers more likely to converge to one
technology, and increase consumers’ valuations of this
technology, which should make firms more willing to
open technologies. The impact on suppliers is, how-
ever, less obvious. On the one hand, the network effects
should make suppliers more willing to invest in open
technologies. On the other hand, since the market is
more likely to converge to one technology, the supplier
may invest in fewer technologies. These are all poten-
tial future research directions.
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Endnotes
1For example, electric cars have simpler structures and higher energy
efficiency, whereas refueling hydrogen fuel cells is much faster than
recharging batteries.
2This observation bears a similarity to the results of Goyal and
Netessine (2007), who show that two competing manufacturers may
both choose dedicated production technologies even if both manu-
facturers choosing flexible production technologies for their respec-
tive products leads to higher profits. On the other hand, we need
to point out that despite the apparent similarity, the two dilemmas
are in fact quite different. Our prisoner’s dilemma is about two man-
ufacturers not sharing their respective technologies with each other,
whereas the prisoner’s dilemma of Goyal and Netessine (2007) is
about each of two manufacturers not using a flexible production
technology for its own products.
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